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Would it be worthwhile to mention some of the simulations/games (like [Core Wars]?) that tended to show that tit-for-tat strategies usually were more successful in the long run? --loh (2001-06-19)
The title of Axelrod's book serves as a link to a description of his simulations that will be filled in at some point. --LDC
Or how about the movie WarGames, which showed (rather pedantically) that sometimes they aren't? ;-) --KQ
Could somebody add about how iterative PD depends on exact values of game matrix ?

One-time PD work for every matrix like this:

    - + 
 -  a 1
 + -1 b
 Where -1<a<b<1

Iterative PD requires additional assumption that a<0, because if a>0 then switching-cooperation is the best algorithm (you achieve more with not cooperating

	than opponent loss from it, so it's best if you both switch, not cooperate)

Are there any other dependencies ?

	--Taw

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Edited August 24, 2001 6:08 pm by 217.98.151.xxx (diff)
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