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Wittgenstein seem to be convinced that many [philosophical problems]? are the result of philosophers failing to properly understand the rules of language. For example a philosopher may ask "What is beauty?" and be convinced that there must be some essential thing which makes something beautiful. But for Wittgenstein, this is just a mistake in grammar. We don't need to understand the essence of beauty to use the word properly, and in fact the search for the essence of beauty creates grammatical confusion about how the word should be used. In the end this grammatical confusion leads philosophers to say strange things which nobody else understands. Instead of searching for a mythical substrate which defines beauty, Wittgenstein suggests that we take our cues from the actual use of the word. In particular Wittgenstein asks us to look at the way in which we teach children to use a word. |
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Wittgenstein seem to be convinced that many [philosophical problems]? are the result of philosophers failing to properly understand the rules of language. For example a philosopher may ask "What is beauty?" and be convinced that there must be some essential thing which makes something beautiful. But for Wittgenstein, this is just a mistake in grammar occasioned by the form of the question "What is beauty?" As a matter of everyday experience, Wittgenstein would point out that we don't need to understand the essence of beauty to use the word properly, and in fact the search for the essence of beauty creates grammatical confusion about how the word should be used. In the end this grammatical confusion leads philosophers to say strange things which nobody else understands. Instead of searching for a mythical substrate which defines beauty, Wittgenstein suggests that we take our cues from the actual use of the word. In particular Wittgenstein asks us to look at the way in which we teach children to use a word. |
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Certainly the above gloss is correct in that the PI deals largely with difficulties of language and meaning. But the fact that he relies so strongly on [indirect argument]?s makes understanding his project difficult. One of the most influential sections of the PI deals directly with meaning and use. As is common in the Wittgenstein's later works, he begins by asking the reader to perform a thought experiment. First he asks the reader to come up with a definition of the word "game." While this may at first seem a simple task, he then goes on to lead us through the problems with each of the possible definitions of the word "game." Any definition which focuses on amusement leaves us unsatisfied since the feelings experienced by a world class chess player are very different than those of a circle of children playing [duck duck goose]?. Any definition which focus on competition will fail to explain the game of catch, or the game of solitaire. And a definition of the word game which focus on rules will fall on similar difficulties. The essential point is not that it is impossible to define game, but that we don't have one, and we don't need one. |
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Certainly the above gloss is correct insofar as it is true that the PI deals largely with difficulties of language and meaning. But the fact that Wittgenstein relies so strongly on [indirect argument]?s makes understanding his project difficult. A closer examination of one of the most influential sections of the PI that deals directly with meaning and use reveals a far more complex view of language than is represented in the simple slogan above. As is common in the Wittgenstein's later works, he begins by asking the reader to perform a thought experiment. First he asks the reader to come up with a definition of the word "game." While this may at first seem a simple task, he then goes on to lead us through the problems with each of the possible definitions of the word "game." Any definition which focuses on amusement leaves us unsatisfied since the feelings experienced by a world class chess player are very different than those of a circle of children playing [duck duck goose]?. Any definition which focus on competition will fail to explain the game of catch, or the game of solitaire. And a definition of the word game which focus on rules will fall on similar difficulties. The essential point of this exersize is often missed. Wittgenstein's point is not that it is impossible to define game, but that we don't have a definition, and we don't need one. |
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Everybody understands what we mean when we talk about playing a game, and we can even clearly identify and correct inaccurate uses of the word. All without reference to any definition of the word. |
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Everybody understands what we mean when we talk about playing a game, and we can even clearly identify and correct inaccurate uses of the word. All without reference to any "definition." |
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How exactly does this work? Why is it that we are sure about we can be sure that a particular activity -- Olympic target shooting -- is a game while a similar activity -- military sharp shooting -- clearly is not. Wittgenstein's explanation is tied up with a important analogy. How do we recognize that two people we know are related to one another? We may see similar height, weight, eye color, hair, nose, mouth, patterns of speech, social or political views, mannerisms, body structure, last names, etc. If we see enough matches we say we've noticed a [/family resemblance]?, at the same time this is not a conscious process -- generally we don't catalog various similarities until we reach a certain threshold, we just intuitively see the resemblances. Wittgenstein suggests that the same may be true of language. Perhaps we are all familiar with enough things which are games, and enough things which are not games that we can instantly categorize new activities intuitively. |
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How exactly does this work? Why is it that we are sure about we can be sure that a particular activity -- Olympic target shooting -- is a game while a similar activity -- military sharp shooting -- is not. Wittgenstein's explanation is tied up with a important analogy. How do we recognize that two people we know are related to one another? We may see similar height, weight, eye color, hair, nose, mouth, patterns of speech, social or political views, mannerisms, body structure, last names, etc. If we see enough matches we say we've noticed a [/family resemblance]?. It is perhaps important to note that this is not always a conscious process -- generally we don't catalog various similarities until we reach a certain threshold, we just intuitively see the resemblances. Wittgenstein suggests that the same may be true of language. Perhaps we are all familiar with enough things which are games, and enough things which are not games that we can instantly categorize new activities intuitively. |
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This brings us back to Wittgenstein's reliance on indirect communication, and his reliance on thought-experiment?s. If many philosophers are confused, it is because they aren't able to intuitively "see" the family resemblances, They've made mistakes in understanding the vague intuitive rules language uses, and have thereby tied themselves up in philosophical knots. To untangle these knots requires more than simple deductive arguments about problems with their particular position. In fact Wittgenstein says that kind of argument only serves to pull the knot tighter. Instead Wittgenstein try's to indirectly re-train their intuitive ability to understand the family resemblances that structure language. |
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This brings us back to Wittgenstein's reliance on indirect communication, and his reliance on thought-experiment?s. If many philosophers are confused, it is because they aren't able to see the family resemblances. They've made mistakes in understanding the vague intuitive rules language uses (which Wittgenstein calls the rules of the language game), and have thereby tied themselves up in philosophical knots. He suggests, that an attempt to untangle these knots requires more than simple deductive arguments which point out the problems with their particular position. Instead Wittgenstein's larger goal seems to be to try to divert them from their philisophical problems long enough to indirectly re-train their intuitive ability to see the family resemblances. |
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