Wikipedia: History of Ontological argument

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<The following is a portion of Larrys Text, wikification is encouraged>

The ontological argument for the existence of God was first proposed by the medieval philosopher [St. Anselm]?. Ontology as a philosophical subdiscipline is concerned with the nature of being. While Anselm himself did not propose an ontological system he was very much concerned with the nature of being. He argued that there are necessary beings -- things which can not not exist -- and contingent beings -- things that can not exist. The ontological argument for the existence of God in all of its interpretations and forms ends with a statement like "God exists and is a necessary being". A very colloquial version of Anselm's conclusion is "God can't not exist." This is obviously a controversial position, and the ontological argument has a long history of detractors and defenders.

The ontological argument for the existence of God was first proposed by the medieval philosopher [St. Anselm]?. Ontology as a philosophical sub-discipline is concerned with the nature of being. While Anselm himself did not propose an ontological system he was very much concerned with the nature of being. He argued that there are necessary beings -- things which can not not exist -- and contingent beings -- things that can not exist. The ontological argument for the existence of God in all of its interpretations and forms ends with a statement like "God exists and is a necessary being". A very colloquial version of Anselm's conclusion is "God can't not exist." This is obviously a controversial position, and the ontological argument has a long history of detractors and defenders.

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There are various kinds of so-called perfections. Size, intelligence, beauty, power, benevolence, and so forth -- all these qualities are called perfections. And there are various degrees of these perfections. What is more intelligent is more perfect as regards intelligence; what is more beautiful is more perfect as regards beauty; and so forth.

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:Anselm, and many others, define God as the perfect being. This means that he has all the perfections to the greatest conceivable degree. Indeed it seems that all of the monotheistic religions make the claim that there is nothing greater than God.

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:2) This concept of God as the greatest conceivable being exists only in his or her mind.

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:But in that case the idea of God is as a being that is only imaginary; so it is not a concept of the greatest conceivable being, because a being that actually exists is a greater being, more perfect, than a being that merely exists in only in the imagination. Existence is a perfection, just like power, beauty, and so forth. So, the concept of the greatest conceivable being, must be a concept of a being that actually exists. A being that didn't exist wouldn't be the greatest conceivable being.

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:That means that the second supposition, that the concept of God exists only in our minds, contradicts the first supposition, that we have a concept of God.

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Of course, Anselm does not present the argument in this form, he presents it as a prayer directed to God. Obviously Anselm thought this argument was valid and persuasive, and it still has many defenders, but there have also been a number of people who claim that the ontological argument, at least as Anselm articulated it, does not stand up to strict logical scrutiny.

Some of those who've argued that the ontological argument fails are content to leave it at that, either because they don't believe that God exists, or because they believe the existence of God is demonstrated on other grounds. Others, like [Alvin Plantinga]?, Kurt Gödel, Gottfried Leibniz and Aquinas have reformulated the argument in order to create stronger versons of the argument.

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I made a quick stab at cleaning up the above. The rest is still as Larry wrote it -- Mark Christensen.

One of the earliest recorded objections to Anselm's argument is was raised by one of Anselm's contemporaries, Gaunilo. Gaunilo invited his readers to think of the greatest, or most perfect, conceivable island. No such island exists, right? But in that case we aren't thinking of the greatest conceivable island, because the greatest conceivable island would exist, as well as having all those other desirable properties. Since we can conceive of this greatest or most perfect conceivable island, then it must exist.

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I'm just going to focus in on a few objections to the argument. The basic trouble seems to be that we have, it appears, simply conceived God into existence. Surely it's very strange to think that all we have to do is to conceive of God as existing, and it follows from that alone that we have good reason to believe that God exists. But let's not jump the gun here; I'm going to present three traditional objections and then present another one of my own.

Of course, this argument seems silly, but Gaunilo claims that it is no worse than Anselm's. In the same way, you could, if you wanted to, "prove" the existence of the most perfect hamburger, the most perfect dumpster, or the most perfect toilet. Defenders of Anselm's argument responded that the idea of an island does not include the notion of perfection, the perfection is merely tacked on, while the concept of God cannot be separated from the notion of perfection. This explains their claim that there is an explanation for the failure of Gaunilo's argument – namely the fact that the island's perfection is contingent -- which doesn't effect the Ontological Argument.

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One traditional criticism of the argument is that existence is not a perfection, because existence is not a property. If existence were a property of items, including God, then it might be a perfection. But since it's not a property, it cannot be a perfection; only properties of things can be perfections of things. Now, we have previously encountered this notion, that existence is not a property, in our discussion of metaphysics. I rather doubt that this view is correct. There are better objections to be made, then, that do not depend on dubious presuppositions like this.

Another traditional criticism of the argument is that existence is not a perfection, because existence is not a property. If existence were a property of items, including God, then it might be a perfection. But since it's not a property, it cannot be a perfection; only properties of things can be perfections of things. But it is hard to understand how existence could not be a property, and many philosophers have rejected this objection because it entails all kinds of other unwanted consequences.

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So a second traditional criticism is to say that, even if existence is a property, it is nonetheless still not a perfection. Either something exists or it doesn't; there aren't any degrees of existence. Something can't be more or less existent. So that's a reason to think that existence isn't a perfection. But to this St. Anselm might reply that, even granted that there aren't degrees of existence, surely existence is more perfect than nonexistence; and in any case, something that exists is greater than something that doesn't. That is certainly plausible. So let us look for more objections.

A third criticism of Anselm's argument rests on the claim that, even if existence is a property, it is still not a perfection. Either something exists or it doesn't; there aren't any degrees of existence. Something can't be more partially existent. It is claimed that this is sufficient reason to believe that existence can't be a perfection because perfections exist along a continuous scale. Defenders of the ontological argument have replied to this objection that, even granted that there aren't degrees of existence, surely existence is more perfect than nonexistence; and in any case, something that exists is greater than something that doesn't.

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So here's a third, famous objection to the ontological argument, raised by Anselm's contemporary, Gaunilo. Gaunilo invited us to think of the greatest, or most perfect, conceivable island; I don't know what would make the island perfect, but say it's sunny, green, great beaches, skiing in the hills, who knows. No such island exists, right? But in that case we aren't thinking of the greatest conceivable island, because the greatest conceivable island would exist, as well as having all those other desirable properties. Since we can conceive of this greatest or most perfect conceivable island, then it must exist.

Obviously Anselm thought this argument was valid and persuasive, and it still has many defenders, but there have also been a number of people who claim that the ontological argument, at least as Anselm articulated it, does not stand up to strict logical scrutiny.

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Of course, this is a silly argument. But, Gaunilo says, this argument no worse than Anselm's. In the same way, you could, if you wanted to, "prove" the existence of the most perfect hamburger, the most perfect dumpster, or the most perfect toilet. That's absurd! But Anselm's argument isn't any worse than these. So Anselm's argument isn't any good either.

Some of those who've argued that the ontological argument fails are content to leave it at that, either because they don't believe that God exists, or because they believe the existence of God is demonstrated on other grounds. Others, like [Alvin Plantinga]?, Kurt Gödel, Gottfried Leibniz and Aquinas have reformulated the argument in order to create stronger versions of the argument.

	Revision 10 . . September 25, 2001 10:40 pm by Mark Christensen [Finished the wikification]
	Revision 9 . . (edit) September 25, 2001 1:04 am by AxelBoldt