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One of the more vexed topics of metaphysics and ontology concerns what might be called objects, objecthood: what general claims can we make about the meaning of talk of objects--bodies such as rocks, trees, as well as (arguably) minds? The leading theories on this admittedly-vague question have it that objects are either substances, which are in some sense distinct from their properties, or else no more than bundles of their properties. The topic is sometimes called "the problem of substance." |
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One of the more vexed topics of metaphysics and ontology concerns what might be called objects, or objecthood: what general claims can we make about the meaning of talk of objects--bodies such as rocks, trees, as well as (arguably) minds? The leading theories on this admittedly-vague question have it that objects are either substances, which are in some sense distinct from their properties, or else no more than bundles of their properties. The topic is sometimes called "the problem of substance." |
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See bundle theory and substance theory for further explanation as well as some arguments for and against each theory. See also mind for discussion of bundle and substance theories of the mind. |
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See substance theory and bundle theory for further explanation as well as some arguments for and against each theory. See also mind for discussion of bundle and substance theories of the mind. |
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