One way to be a nominalist without being an "[ostrich nominalist]?" like the predicate nominalists ("ostrich" because they seem to simply stick their heads in the sand and pretend there isn't a problem--the phrase is Armstrong?'s) is to build a theory of resemblance nominalism on a theory of trope?s. A trope is a particular instance of a property, like the specific greenness of this here shirt, or the singular coyness of Gwyneth's smile. One might argue that there is a primitive?, objective? resemblance relation that holds among like tropes. But that seems arbitrary. Another route is to argue that all apparent tropes are constructed out of more primitive tropes and that the most primitive tropes are the entities of a complete physics. Primitive trope resemblance may thus be accounted for in terms of causal indiscernibility?. Two tropes are exactly resembling if switching them would make no difference to the events in which they are taking part. Varying degrees of resemblance at the macro level can be explained at by varying degrees of resemblance at the micro level, and micro-level resemblance is explained in terms of something no less robustly physical than causal power. Armstrong, perhaps the most prominent contemporary realist, argues that such a trope-based resemblance nominalism has promise, but holds that it is unable to account for the laws of nature in the way his theory of universals can. -- Will Wilkinson
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