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Frege? and Russell, among many others, for similar reasons are well-known for their view that 'exists' is not a (logical) predicate?, or more precisely, not a first-order predicate--or, perhaps equivalently (and perhaps not), that existence is not a property. This has become the dominant but not the universal view in twentieth-century and contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. But, as G. E. Moore pointed out in an early essay, it is a matter of some difficulty to say what exactly what this view amounts to. [This too needs to be greatly expanded, and probably made into its own article.] |
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Frege? and Russell, among many others, for similar reasons are well-known for their view that 'exists' is not a (logical) predicate?, or more precisely, not a first-order predicate--or, perhaps equivalently (and perhaps not), that existence is not a property. This has become the dominant but not the universal view in twentieth-century and contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. But, as G. E. Moore pointed out in an early essay, it is a matter of some difficulty to say what exactly what this view amounts to. [This too needs to be greatly expanded, and probably made into its own article.] |
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