[Home]Voting paradox

HomePage | Recent Changes | Preferences

Difference (from prior major revision) (no other diffs)

Changed: 14c14
See also [Arrow's Impossibility Theorem]? and Paradox.
See also: [Arrow's Impossibility Theorem]?, Paradox, Condorcets Method.

The voting paradox is a situation noted by the [Marquis de Condorcet]? in the late 18th century, in which collective preferences can be cyclic, even if the preferences of individual voters are not.

This is best illustrated by an example. Suppose we have three candidates, A, B and C, and that there are three voters with preferences as follows (candidates being listed in decreasing order of preference):

Voter 1: A B C
Voter 2: B C A
Voter 3: C A B

The majority view of the voters in this situation is that B is better than C, who is better than A, who is better than B, who is better than C, etc.

See also: [Arrow's Impossibility Theorem]?, Paradox, Condorcets Method.


HomePage | Recent Changes | Preferences
This page is read-only | View other revisions
Last edited December 1, 2001 4:47 am by 204.96.33.xxx (diff)
Search: