[Home]History of SemanticDispute

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Revision 10 . . February 2, 2001 7:53 am by LarrySanger
Revision 9 . . February 2, 2001 7:31 am by LarrySanger
Revision 8 . . (edit) February 2, 2001 7:25 am by LarrySanger
Revision 7 . . (edit) February 2, 2001 7:21 am by LarrySanger
Revision 6 . . (edit) February 2, 2001 7:21 am by LarrySanger
Revision 5 . . (edit) February 2, 2001 7:21 am by LarrySanger
Revision 4 . . (edit) February 2, 2001 7:20 am by LarrySanger
Revision 3 . . (edit) February 2, 2001 7:19 am by LarrySanger
Revision 2 . . (edit) February 2, 2001 7:19 am by LarrySanger
Revision 1 . . February 2, 2001 7:18 am by LarrySanger
  

Difference (from prior major revision) (no other diffs)

Changed: 1c1
A dispute is semantic if (1) the parties to the DisAgreement? agree on all material facts, but (2) disagree on the DefinitioNs of key terms (they have different understandings of the meaning, the words are associated with different ConcepT? s) used to formulate contrary theses (i.e., two theses that cannot both be true). Consequently, their disagreeing on these definitions explains why there is a dispute at all.
A DisAgreement? is a semantic dispute if (1) the parties to the DisAgreement? disagree about whether a particular claim is true, (2) they agree on all material facts, but (3) they disagree on the DefinitioNs of a word (or several words) essential to formulating the claim at issue (they have different understandings of the MeaninG? of a word, the words are associated with different ConcepT? s). Consequently, their disagreeing on these definitions explains why there is a dispute at all; briefly, (2) and (3) together explain (1).

Changed: 3c3
It is sometimes held that semantic disputes are not genuine disputes at all, but very often they are regarded as perfectly genuine, e.g., in PhiloSophy. One might well wonder, of course, exactly what turns on the claim that a dispute is "genuine" (see GenuineDisputes?).
It is sometimes held that semantic disputes are not genuine disputes at all. But very often they are regarded as perfectly genuine, e.g., in PhiloSophy. One might well wonder, of course, exactly what turns on the claim that a dispute is "genuine" (see GenuineDisputes?).

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