[Home]History of HoldMoreStubbornlyAtLeast

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Revision 4 . . (edit) February 6, 2001 12:36 pm by LarrySanger
Revision 3 . . January 30, 2001 5:04 am by AyeSpy
Revision 2 . . January 20, 2001 9:23 am by AyeSpy
  

Difference (from prior major revision) (minor diff, author diff)

Changed: 1c1
On Quine's conception of a person's set of beliefs as a "seamless web," there is no proposition one could not in principle give up (if there were, there would be a "seam" in the web, protecting the principle from revision or rejection)or HoldComeWhatMay. However, some beliefs may be more useful than others, or may be implicated by a large number of beliefs. Examples might be laws of logic, or the belief in an external world of physical objects. Altering such portions of the web would have immense, ramifying consequences. It is better to alter auxilliary beliefs around the edges of the web in the face of new evidence unfriendly to one's central principles. Thus, while one might agree that there is no belief one can hold come what may, there are some for which there is ample practical ground to hold more stubbornly at least.
On WVOQuinE?'s conception of a person's set of beliefs as a "seamless web," there is no proposition one could not in principle give up (if there were, there would be a "seam" in the web, protecting the principle from revision or rejection)or HoldComeWhatMay. However, some beliefs may be more useful than others, or may be implicated by a large number of beliefs. Examples might be laws of logic, or the belief in an external world of physical objects. Altering such portions of the web would have immense, ramifying consequences. It is better to alter auxilliary beliefs around the edges of the web in the face of new evidence unfriendly to one's central principles. Thus, while one might agree that there is no belief one can hold come what may, there are some for which there is ample practical ground to hold more stubbornly at least.

Changed: 3,7c3
One may certainly hold more stubbornly at least to those notions which serve to give context, comprehensibility, and utility to other notions.

Care should be taken, however, not to exclude new information which is not inherently self-contradictory. To the degree that new data conflicts with a large body of mutually consistent observations (note: observations - not beliefs) one may more safely devalue it, but that a new idea was not suggested by one's interpretation of earlier data is not the same as to say that one may safely discard it because it comes as a complete surprise. Rather, "surprise" information, instead of being automatically viewed with skepticism, may be be held in a bullpen while it is compared with other cross-verifying observations, and, if not inherently inconsistent with old data, accepted conditionally for purposes of comparison with new input in order to see what it does or does not explain.

People call this "having an open mind."
HoldMoreStubbornlyAtLeastTalk

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