A definition of goodness would be valuable because it might allow one to construct a good life or society |
A definition of goodness would be valuable because it might allow one to construct a good life or society |
subsidiary concepts. Both approaches have failed to define goodness. |
subsidiary concepts. Both approaches have failed to define goodness. |
or properties that would justify calling a thing good are different for different categories of judgement. |
or properties that would justify calling a thing good are different for different categories of judgment. |
are different from those by which we judge people |
are different from those by which we judge people |
A famous early discussion of this problem is by Aristotle, |
A famous early discussion of this problem is by Aristotle, |
Many judgements of goodness translate to prices, but this appears to be an summary or effect of judgement, not a cause. For example, |
Many judgments of goodness translate to prices, but this appears to be an summary or effect of judgment, not a cause. For example, |
and sell it for more than the price of a house. The price changed because the collector had better judgement than the owner who kept it in an attic. |
and sell it for more than the price of a house. The price changed because the collector had better judgment than the owner who kept it in an attic. |
If goodness were a common trait or property, we should be able to abstract it, but no one has succeeded. |
If goodness were a common trait or property, we should be able to abstract it, but no one has succeeded. |
of any natural thing or state of affairs. |
of any natural thing or state of affairs. |
Some philosophers go so far as to say that if some state of affairs |
Some philosophers go so far as to say that if some state of affairs |
Epicurus made the first known attempt to define goodness as subjective pleasure, and its opposite as pain. This is called Hedonism. |
Epicurus made the first known attempt to define goodness as subjective pleasure, and its opposite as pain. This is called Hedonism. |
there seem to be pleasures that are bad (e.g. eating too much) |
there seem to be pleasures that are bad (e.g. eating too much) |
It's strange to say that carrying out one's duty |
It's strange to say that carrying out one's duty |
happiness from amusement, and |
happiness from amusement, and |
The usual fix of Hedonism is to consider consequences, |
The usual fix of Hedonism is to consider consequences, |
For example. going to a dentist has a small amount of pain now, but avoids a great deal more later. |
For example. going to a dentist has a small amount of pain now, but avoids a great deal more later. |
problems for Hedonism. |
problems for Hedonism. |
No known definitions of happiness or pleasure have met objections similar to those of a definition |
No known definitions of happiness or pleasure have met objections similar to those of a definition |
categories of action. Neither happiness nor pleasure has been conceptually divided (analyzed) in a way that permits |
categories of action. Neither happiness nor pleasure has been conceptually divided (analyzed) in a way that permits |
were divided, or causally regressed far enough, the process |
were divided, or causally regressed far enough, the process |
Attempts to translate, divide or causally regress |
Attempts to translate, divide or causally regress |
particular way. Every such attempt seems to end up with |
particular way. Every such attempt seems to end up with |
"virtuous." Such definitions appear to |
"virtuous." Such definitions appear to |
science cannot study goodness. Some philosophers have gone so far |
science cannot study goodness. Some philosophers have gone so far |
in "A Treatise Concerning Human Understanding," who famously said that there is no logical way to convert an "ought" |
in "A Treatise Concerning Human Understanding," who famously said that there is no logical way to convert an "ought" |
[G.E. Moore]? described this circularity clearly and called |
[G.E. Moore]? described this circularity clearly and called |
that people had a sort of nonphysical intuition that could sense goodness. Few people believe in this intuition, |
that people had a sort of nonphysical intuition that could sense goodness. Few people believe in this intuition, |
Many philosophers tried to end the regressions by applying |
Many philosophers tried to end the regressions by applying |
For example, Aristotle considered "The supreme |
For example, Aristotle considered "The supreme |
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1177a15) In this case, supremity |
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1177a15) In this case, supremity |
Thomas Aquinas asserted that everything sensed was an effect, with an earlier cause, and that each immediate (proximal) |
Thomas Aquinas asserted that everything sensed was an effect, with an earlier cause, and that each immediate (proximal) |
perfectly good. In this case, the concept of dilution might |
perfectly good. In this case, the concept of dilution might |
pretty good, instead of perfect). One might also doubt that the causal regression ends: It might be circular, for instance. |
pretty good, instead of perfect). One might also doubt that the causal regression ends: It might be circular, for instance. |
the Summa Theologica- can anyone find the reference |
the Summa Theologica- can anyone find the reference |
Philosophers have made progress against the |
Philosophers have made progress against the |
Aristotle pointed out that some goods |
Aristotle pointed out that some goods |
useful only to get other goods. He called these "intrinsic goods" and "instrumental goods." For example, |
useful only to get other goods. He called these "intrinsic goods" and "instrumental goods." For example, |
need some emergent property of a whole state-of-affairs in order to be good. |
need some emergent property of a whole state-of-affairs in order to be good. |
a prepared meal. Other exampless come from music and language. |
a prepared meal. Other exampless come from music and language. |
desireable mental states also say that goods are experiences of self-aware beings. These philosophers often distinguish the |
desireable mental states also say that goods are experiences of self-aware beings. These philosophers often distinguish the |
containing an "if" clause. Further, the "if" clause often described the category in which the judgement was made (Art, science, etc.). Kant described these as "hypothetical goods," and tried to find a "categorical" good that would operate across all categories of judgement. |
containing an "if" clause. Further, the "if" clause often described the category in which the judgment was made (Art, science, etc.). Kant described these as "hypothetical goods," and tried to find a "categorical" good that would operate across all categories of judgment. |
was a moral command, the "categorical imperative": |
was a moral command, the "categorical imperative": |
could will to be universal law." From this, and a few other |
could will to be universal law." From this, and a few other |
any "praiseworthy person." (See "Foundations of the |
any "praiseworthy person." (See "Foundations of the |
It's clear that a general definition of goodness must categorically define goods that are ultimate, intrinsic, non-contributory, and at least |
It's clear that a general definition of goodness must categorically define goods that are ultimate, intrinsic, non-contributory, and at least |
answer skeptics. The problems with such lists are that they are likely |
answer skeptics. The problems with such lists are that they are likely |
[Jeremy Bentham]?'s book "The Principles of Morals and |
[Jeremy Bentham]?'s book "The Principles of Morals and |
by considering pleasure, pain and consequences. This theory |
by considering pleasure, pain and consequences. This theory |
Utilitarianism succeeds in many cases. However Utilitarianism has some questionable areas of judgement. For example, it considers all goods as interchangeable. If |
Utilitarianism succeeds in many cases. However Utilitarianism has some questionable areas of judgment. For example, it considers all goods as interchangeable. If |
Unhappily, the utilitarian argument to permit abortions is of the same form as this questionable type, though with changed |
Unhappily, the utilitarian argument to permit abortions is of the same form as this questionable type, though with changed |
To see this, substitute "unconscious fetus, destined for loveless poverty" |
To see this, substitute "unconscious fetus, destined for loveless poverty" |
judgement remains invalid, while a utilitarian might |
judgment remains invalid, while a utilitarian might |
In another widely questioned set of judgements, Utilitarians weigh |
In another widely questioned set of judgments, Utilitarians weigh |
justice. Rawls defined justice as fairness, especially in |
justice. Rawls defined justice as fairness, especially in |
and attempted to prove that just institutions and lives |
and attempted to prove that just institutions and lives |
Rawls?' crucial invention was "[the original position]?," a procedure in which |
Rawls?' crucial invention was "[the original position]?," a procedure in which |
to be both prior to and essential to fairness, and different for different beings. Procedurally fair processes of the type used by Kant and Rawls may therefore reduce the totality of goodness, and thereby be unfair. |
to be both prior to and essential to fairness, and different for different beings. Procedurally fair processes of the type used by Kant and Rawls may therefore reduce the totality of goodness, and thereby be unfair. |
to own an orange, the standard fair procedure is to cut it in two, |
to own an orange, the standard fair procedure is to cut it in two, |
procedurally-fair procedure to mediate between a baker and an eater |
procedurally-fair procedure to mediate between a baker and an eater |
Also see value theory. |
Also see value theory. |