Wikipedia: Ontological argument/Talk

My own objection to the ontological argument is simply this: The only thing that it proves, is that we can conceive the greatest conceivable being to really exist. If we conceive that this greatest conceivable being really exists, it does not get any greater in our conception by really existing outside my conception.

From a wholly different angle, the argument uses the premisse that we can conceive this greatest conceivable being. It is very much the question whether we can conceive the greatest conceivable being. I think many theists would agree if I said that God cannot be completely conceived by us at all. There is also the question whether there even exists something like a 'greatest conceivable being'. There might well be for every conceivable being a greater one. Or there might be two beings such that neither is greater than the other, nor any being that is greater than both.

-- Andre Engels

I've done a bit of work on the article, and I think the it is a bit better. I've removed the first and second person references, and done a little work on set up. I don't think I've made substantial changes to the logic of Larry's presentation, (though by removing the second person, the argument now relies not on the reader's ability to have a concept of God, but on "someone" having that ability), but I have tried to clarify the presentation, and formalize it just a bit.

In an ideal world, I'd like to see several things happen to this page:

A subpage discussing how to understand Anselm's argument, and discussing the ways that the text is interpreted by contemporary scholars.
lLnks to contemporary reformulations like Goedels ontological proof as well as to pages which describe the counter arguments of people like Russel and Hume.
Some information about the presupositionalist interpertation of Anselm's notion of "faith seeking understanding" as it relates how we should understand his "proofs."
A link to the text of Anselm's argument in translation, and in it's origonal form.

     --Mark Christensen

Here's Larry's argument against the ontological argument.

I'm going to offer an objection of my own. For the sake of simplicity, I'm going to restate the argument. It would take me too long, and it would be too hard to follow, for me to explain why I think my restatement is equivalent to St. Anselm's original argument. So you're just going to have to trust me that it is the same as Anselm's original. So here goes:

1. Suppose, just for the sake of argument, that the greatest conceivable being (call it B1) exists only in the mind.

2. But we can conceive of a being (call it B2) that is greater than any being that exists only in the mind.

3. So, we can conceive of a being (namely, B2) that is greater than B1 (since we are supposing that B1 exists only in the mind).

4. But then we can conceive of a being that is greater than the greatest conceivable being (B1) which is a contradiction.

5. Therefore, our supposition in (1) is wrong; the greatest conceivable being really exists, and not only in the mind.

That's the argument. Here's my criticism: I think that (4) does not follow from (3). I fully admit premise (3). Yes, since we are supposing that B1 exists only in the mind, we can conceive of a being (namely, B2) that is greater than B1. In other words, we can imagine that that being, God, which, as we suppose in premise (1), exists only in the mind, did not only exist in the mind, but also in reality. Sure, we can imagine that. But that doesn't mean that we can conceive of a being that is greater than the greatest conceivable being! Why would St. Anselm think that that follows?

Well, according to (3), we can conceive of a being that is greater than B1; and B1, remember, is the greatest conceivable being. So naturally you'd think that (3) entails (4), that we can conceive of a being that is greater than the greatest conceivable being. But B1 isn't the greatest conceivable being, itself; B1 is a concept of the greatest conceivable being. It's an idea we have of the greatest conceivable being.

Why do I say that? Look at premise (1) again. It says: "Suppose, just for the sake of argument, that the greatest conceivable being (call it B1) exists only in the mind." (Anselm's phrase is: "Exists in the understanding alone.") Now what is this thing, B1, which we say exists only in the mind? What is it? Is it the greatest conceivable being, itself, or is it, more precisely stated, a concept of the greatest conceivable being? Clearly, it's only the concept that can exist in the mind. We would never admit that the greatest conceivable being itself might somehow exist only in our minds. That wouldn't make any sense! In other words, when we say that the greatest conceivable being exists "in the mind," or "in the understanding alone," we just mean that we have a concept of the greatest conceivable being. And then we use the words "greatest conceivable being" as short for "concept of the greatest conceivable being." Make sense?

So here's my criticism summed up. St. Anselm's argument, as I presented it, claims, in premise (3), that we can conceive of a being that is greater than B1. But B1 is just a concept; even if it is the concept of the greatest conceivable being, it's nonetheless still a concept. And so of course we can conceive of lots of things greater than that concept. But premise (4) doesn't follow from any of the foregoing -- it just doesn't follow that I can conceive of something greater than the greatest conceivable being. All that follows is that I can conceive of something greater than my concept of the greatest conceivable being. Which is no big surprise!

The following passage appears twice on the page: "Obviously Anselm thought this argument was valid and persuasive, and it still has many defenders, but there have also been a number of people who claim that the ontological argument, at least as Anselm articulated it, does not stand up to strict logical scrutiny." Which occurence should be removed?